THE U.S. ROLE IN THE MADRID PEACE PROCESS: A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH
(ABSTRACT)

The Madrid Peace Process has been dominated since its beginning in October 1991 by the U.S. as the most important extraregional power. Although the Soviet Union/ Russia is the second official co-sponsor beside the US, it were the United States, who have fostered the Arab-Israeli negotiations substantially by preparing a framework for the meeting of the parties or by suggesting bridging proposals on their own. Moreover they have played a crucial role in implementing the reached accords, either by providing the necessary financial means or by offering political and security-related guarantees. Therefore they are the only political player in the international system, which has the political power and the necessary capacities to urge the regional parties to compromises and to enhance security in the region.(1) Moreover it offers security not just to Israel, but also to the oil producing, "conservative" monarchies in the Arab-Persian Gulf, mainly Saudi-Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE.

On this background the paper develops a conceptual approach to describe the American policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict during the 1990s by using a systemic role model.

The role of a Facilitator is the position, which the U.S. administration prefers most. This position is possible, when the regional parties have agreed principally to negotiate on the basis of the formaula "Land for Peace" and are able and willing to reach bilateral understandings. Then the U.S. can restrict itself to fostering the Arab-Israeli talks by setting a framework for negotiations, but doesn´t have to take part in them or even suggesting American peace plans. In this role the political costs for the U.S. are more or less marginal.

In case, that the regional parties can´t agree on any accords, e.g. in the Israeli-Syrian negotiations from 1991 until 1996, one party proves her intransigence for different, mostly domestic reasons, or doesn´t accept the basic formula of the Madrid Process any more, the U.S. have to act as a Broker. Fulfilling this task, they urge the regional parties to compromises by a policy of "Sticks and Carrots". They offer bridging proposals on their own (e.g. the American plan for a Israeli 13.1% withdrawal from the Westbank and the Gaza Strip), guarantee the reached accord and arbitrate between the regional parties (e.g. in the context of the Hebron protocol of January 1997). In this case, the success of the Madrid process also stems from the regional parties, but the U.S. have to commit themselves to the region more than they actually want.

Especially, when the peace process seems to be on the brink, another, broader role of the U.S. in the Arab-Israeli conflict emerges: the U.S. role of a Stabilizer. From this perspective Washington tries to structure the regional order in a way, that the peace process isn´t substantially threatened by any state or group in the region or by any extraregional power. This approach is reflected in the American efforts to integrate other powers of the international system into the U.S. Middle East approach, e.g. the European Union, or to contrain their influence in the Middle East, e.g. France, China and Russia. Also the American policy towards the states of the Arab-Persian Gulf serves the purpose of regional security and stability by containing the influence of destabilizing factors. In this role the U.S. emerges as the most important player offering security to regional parties either by the multilateral framework of the Madrid process or by bilateral agreements with regional parties.

A last role of the U.S. has to be mentioned, which actually is included in every other mentioned role, but emerges clearly in the hypothetical case, that the Madrid process may suffer from serious backlashes; that Iran or Iraq would be ready to use their WMD capacities against Israel, threaten one of the oil monarchies in the Arab-Persian Gulf or that the security and existence of Israel would be seriously in doubt. In this case, the U.S. policy in the region would be reduced to the role of a Security Guard, which would leave the Madrid Peace Process behind. The American policy to secure the qualitative edge of Israel´s military capabilities and the "Dual Containment" policy towards Iraq and Iran are reflections of this approach.

The results of this analysis, which uses the theoretical approach of a systemic role model, underline, to which degree the American policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, beside its domestic determinants, is crucially dependent on intraregional and even intrastate dynamics. Therefore it would be a misperception to regard the United States as the omnipotent hegemon in the region. On the contrary, every administration has to adjust its policy goals in the Middle East and the instruments to pursue them according to the constraints, which may derive from the policy of regional powers.

1. Kaim, Markus: Zwischen globaler Hegemonie und regionaler Begrenzung. Die amerikanische Politik im arabisch-israelischen Konflikt (Nomos Universitätsschriften Politik, Bd.93), Baden-Baden 1998; ders.: Macht oder Ohnmacht der USA im Nahen Osten? Die Politik der Clinton-Administration im israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikt (HSFK-Report 3/1999), Frankfurt/M. 1999; ders.: Der Einfluß ist begrenzt. Das amerikanisch-israelische Verhältnis und die Spannungen zwischen Clinton und Netanjahu, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) v. 15.05.1999; Hubel, Helmut/ Kaim, Markus/ Lembcke, Oliver: Pax Americana im Nahen Osten. Eine Studie zur Transformation regionaler Ordnungen), Baden-Baden 2000.