Departamento de Eurasia<\/p>\n
Anuar Temirov<\/p>\n
Abstract: Recent developments in Central Asia, including the signing of the historic Khujand Treaty between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in March 2025 to resolve longstanding border disputes and the intensification of diplomatic and economic ties with Afghanistan and Mongolia, particularly in transportation and logistics, reflect a new momentum of regionalism and pragmatic interdependence. Using Frederick Starr\u2019s theoretical framework of \u201cGreater Central Asia,\u201d this article examines the evolving dynamics of intra-regional rapprochement within Post-Central Asia, comprised of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and its growing yet still modest economic ties with Afghanistan and Mongolia. It argues that an economic necessity to diversify transit routes and pragmatism due to the current Afghan government\u2019s openness towards receiving foreign investment to rebuild the country has contributed to a visibly increased level of regional cooperation. However, improving connectivity in Greater Central Asia has been also partially driven by the influence of external powers, therefore a comprehensive further analysis is needed to disaggregate its impact on the development of intra-regional ties.<\/p>\n
Since 1991, there have been efforts undertaken to pursue a greater level of interdependence and economic integration in Central Asia, however, most of the times the countries were unable to progress on establishing effective intra-regional mechanisms and were incorporated to a broader context of integration mechanisms, which include external actors. However, the evolving political will to overcome intra-regional frictions, particularly among the five post-Soviet republics\u2014Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan\u2014demonstrates a departure from the disjointed regionalism that characterized much of the post-independence period (Cooley, 2012; Laruelle, 2012). Bohr (2004) has previously underscored the fragmented nature of Central Asian diplomacy, citing both elite rivalries and external dependencies as primary obstacles to integration. However, the current moment presents a more nuanced landscape shaped by both internal economic imperatives and geopolitical shifts in a broader Eurasian region.<\/p>\n
In recent years, Central Asia has witnessed a subtle but significant transformation in the dynamics of regional cooperation, most notably marked by the signing of the historic Khujand Treaty in March 2025 between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. This agreement, which resolved several decades-old border disputes, symbolizes not only a triumph of diplomacy but also a broader shift toward pragmatic regionalism (Special Eurasia OSINT Team, 2025).<\/p>\n
Concurrently, the intensification of relations with Afghanistan and Mongolia\u2014particularly in the realms of transportation infrastructure, trade corridors, and logistics\u2014signals a new era of strategic interdependence in what Frederick Starr (2005) conceptualizes as \u00abGreater Central Asia.\u00bb This term expands the conventional definition of Central Asia to include Afghanistan, Mongolia, and parts of South Asia to five Post-Soviet stans. Starr argues that these countries share historical and civilizational ties\u2014most notably in trade (e.g., Silk Road routes), Islam, and nomadic cultures\u2014that can be revitalized for modern geoeconomic cooperation. He posits that regional integration should not be constrained by post-Soviet geography but expanded to encompass neighboring states with shared strategic interests in energy, transit, and security. While the institutionalization of this concept remains limited, recent initiatives such as Uzbekistan\u2019s push for the Trans-Afghan Railway, and the possible transport corridor to Mongolia demonstrate the region\u2019s slow but deliberate movement toward Starr\u2019s vision. The emerging ties between Central Asia and Afghanistan and Mongolia reflect a pragmatic approach by Post-Soviet Central Asian elites to hedge against geopolitical uncertainties. Thus, Starr\u2019s conceptual lens offers a valuable, even though not exclusive framework for interpreting the current phase of regional outreach and transport diversification.<\/p>\n
This article argues that the emergence of a more cohesive regional approach is partially grounded in economic necessity\u2014particularly the diversification of transit and trade routes amid shifting global supply chains\u2014and partially in the relative openness of the Afghan government to foreign investment and regional integration. Nonetheless, while the recent momentum toward greater connectivity and political alignment within Greater Central Asia is notable, the role of external actors remains complex. As such, this article seeks to build upon the empirical insights of existing literature to assess the current state of the formation of Greater Central Asia.<\/p>\n
The structure of this article will be as follows. First, the conceptual framework of Starr\u2019s Greater Central Asia will be revisited and then compared to a current state of regional cooperation between Post-Soviet Central Asia, Mongolia, and Afghanistan. Despite a growing momentum for Starr\u2019s theory to become a new geopolitical reality for the region, several important factors, such as the external presence of Russia and China and their economic interests in the region and geopolitical risks related to the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and still relevant evaluation of current Afghan government\u2019s stability pose important questions to the full realization of the geopolitical reconfiguration towards greater connectivity.<\/p>\n
Frederick Starr\u2019s concept of Greater Central Asia (GCA), first articulated in 2005, calls for reimagining the boundaries of Central Asia beyond the five post-Soviet republics to include Afghanistan, Mongolia, parts of Iran, western China, and northern South Asia (Starr, 2005). Starr argues that these countries share enduring civilizational and historical linkages, such as the legacy of Silk Road commerce, nomadic heritage, and Islamic cultural influences, which provide a basis for strategic and economic reintegration in the 21st century. Central to his thesis is the notion that regional connectivity\u2014especially infrastructural, trade, and transit corridors\u2014should be cultivated independently of great power competition, thereby giving agency to the region\u2019s internal dynamics. Starr positions Afghanistan not as a periphery of instability but as a geographic and economic hub that could catalyze broader regional integration through north-south energy routes and rail infrastructure (Kangas, 2007). The theory thus envisions a pluralistic, multipolar Central Asia, capable of engaging equally with East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and the West.<\/p>\n
However, the GCA framework has received significant critique from both regional scholars and international analysts. One major criticism concerns its underestimation of the persistent external leverage in the region\u2014particularly from Russia and China\u2014whose political and economic interests often override intra-regional initiatives. As Cooley (2012) and Laruelle (2012) argue, Central Asian states operate within a constrained geopolitical environment where decisions are shaped as much by Moscow\u2019s security and economic architecture (e.g., CSTO, EAEU) and Beijing\u2019s Belt and Road Initiative as by internal regional dynamics. Furthermore, the GCA concept presupposes a level of mutual trust and institutional capacity that remains underdeveloped. Starr\u2019s vision of a cohesive regional order often fails to account for unresolved border disputes, elite competition, and asymmetric development patterns among the Central Asian republics themselves (Kushkumbayev, 2022). Critics also note that the inclusion of fragile states like Afghanistan introduces volatility into the regional calculus, particularly given the Taliban\u2019s limited recognition and uncertain commitment to transnational projects (Zaland, 2025). Lastly, the GCA model places strong emphasis on geography and history but lacks mechanisms for sustained political coordination and supranational governance. As a result, while Starr\u2019s theory is influential in expanding the conceptual geography of Central Asia, its practical realization faces structural and geopolitical limitations.<\/p>\n
Nowadays, regional cooperation in Post-Soviet Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, is gaining a new momentum after several attempts to build intra-regional integration models without success. The political and economic rapprochement within the region of 5 post-Soviet republics drives and influences further integration on the Eurasian continent. Since 1991, the newly independent Central Asian republics sought to construct regional cooperation frameworks to manage common challenges such as security, economic transition, and infrastructure development. Several initiatives emerged during the 1990s, including the Central Asian Economic Union (CAEU), later renamed the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO), and other intergovernmental attempts aimed at fostering intraregional integration. At that time, it was hard to imagine the growing debate about incorporating Afghanistan to the Central Asian geopolitical region, as the country was experiencing a civil war (Zaland, 2025). On the other hand, Mongolia\u2019s relations with independent Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan had a promising start in the 1990s, but then stagnated in 2000s due to a lack of interest from all sides (Irgengioro, 2023).<\/p>\n
However, despite initial enthusiasm, the exclusively Central Asian intra-regional projects largely failed to materialize into effective institutional mechanisms. Scholars such as Bohr (2004) and Collins (2006) argue that the lack of political trust, divergent national interests, and competition over leadership roles undermined the sustainability of these efforts. Moreover, Cooley (2012) highlights that external actors\u2014particularly Russia, China, and the United States\u2014quickly filled the regional vacuum, further fragmenting intra-regional unity and pushing states to pursue bilateral rather than multilateral alignments. Unlike the largely unsuccessful regional initiatives of the 1990s, most of the enduring cooperative structures in Central Asia have been established with the involvement of external powers. These include the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the China-driven Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), where both Afghanistan and Mongolia have observer status, the T\u00fcrkiye-initiated Organization of Turkic States, and various \u201cC5+\u201d formats initiated by external actors such as the United States, Japan, the European Union (some European countries, such as Germany and Italy have their own C5+ meeting platforms with the region too), India, and South Korea. These frameworks reflect the region\u2019s strategic openness to extra-regional partnerships and, indeed, a vision of an inseparable bond of inner Eurasia with the rest of the continent. However, a cohesive internal Central Asian integration agenda has been lacking. The only exclusively intra-regional platform to emerge in recent years has been the Central Asian Consultative Meeting, launched in 2018 at the initiative of Kazakhstan. However, this format remains largely consultative, which, somehow, reflects a pragmatic stance of countries\u2019 elites towards regional integration. As of 2025, six such meetings have taken place: in Astana (2018 and 2024), Tashkent (2019), virtual format (2020, due to the pandemic), Cholpon-Ata (2022), and Dushanbe (2023). These summits have focused on strengthening political dialogue, transport and logistics, water and energy cooperation, and coordinated responses to global challenges such as climate change and post-pandemic recovery. An agreement signed during the Dushanbe summit to create a joint commission to monitor compliance with the terms of the Agreement on strengthening the interconnection of land transport in Central Asia was viewed as a breakthrough which could possibly lie to the establishment of other supranational bodies (Gusseinov, 2023).<\/p>\n
As the region has been grappling with shifting geopolitical currents, such as the Russia-Ukraine war, return of Taliban to power in Afghanistan, and growing instability in the Middle East, which have added a layer of economic volatility, the emergence of new initiatives suggests a renewed interest in fostering regional ties. On 31 March 2025, the presidents of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan convened in the Tajik city of Khujand to sign the Treaty on the Junction Point of State Borders and the Khujand Declaration of Eternal Friendship, which formally demarcated the tripoint of their national borders in the historically contested Fergana Valley. This agreement marked the resolution of one of Central Asia\u2019s last major territorial disputes, inherited from Soviet-era border demarcations that had long generated regional tension, especially around enclaves and infrastructure access (Special Eurasia OSINT Team, 2025). The treaty enabled the reopening of previously closed border crossings and introduced prospects for greater cooperation in trade, infrastructure, and water and energy management within Post-Soviet Central Asia and beyond (Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies, 2025). The trilateral summit also saw the unveiling of a symbolic Friendship Monument at the junction point and was widely viewed as a diplomatic breakthrough toward deeper regional integration (Omirgazy, 2025) and a sign that Central Asian countries are taking increasing ownership of regional security and integration processes, independent of larger external powers (Special Eurasia OSINT Team, 2025).<\/p>\n
Until very recently, Post-Soviet Central Asia has been struggling to strengthen regional identity and have closer relations with other two GCA states: Afghanistan and Mongolia. Traditionally, Afghanistan has been framed as a source of instability and threat for its northern neighbors due to a combination of enduring internal vulnerabilities and transnational security risks (Zaland, 2025). The persistent weakness of state institutions, coupled with factionalism, corruption, and limited central control over peripheral provinces, has undermined the Afghan government’s capacity to maintain order and deliver services. This fragility was exacerbated by the presence of international terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State\u2013Khorasan Province (IS-KP), which exploited ungoverned spaces to operate near the borders of Central Asia. The 2021 Taliban takeover further complicated regional security calculations, as their return to power generated uncertainty about the regime\u2019s ability\u2014or willingness\u2014to prevent cross-border extremist movements and uphold international norms. These factors have historically justified a cautious and securitized approach to Afghanistan by its northern neighbors, despite emerging efforts to reframe the country as a potential hub for trade and connectivity (Giustozzi, 2022). However, Central Asian states have increasingly adopted a pragmatic approach towards Afghanistan. Moreover, Afghanistan outlined a boost of trade and attraction of foreign direct investment as key economic priorities for the Taliban government, alongside achieving economic self-sufficiency (Yawar, 2023). Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have continued infrastructure and energy projects with Afghanistan, notably the proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, Trans-Afghan Railway, CASA-1000 electricity project exemplify regional commitment to infrastructure-based connectivity (Zimmerman, 2015). Signed in 2025, the Uzbekistan\u2013Afghanistan\u2013Pakistan railway agreement aims to advance the creation of a unified Eurasian transport corridor and strengthens multilateral cooperation by accelerating the implementation of a 700-kilometer route through Afghanistan, linking Mazar-e-Sharif to Peshawar via Kabul and the Torkham border. Initially proposed by Uzbekistan in 2018, the $7 billion project is expected to cut cargo transit time between Uzbekistan and Pakistan from 35 days to just 3\u20135 days, offering Central Asia direct access to the Arabian Sea (Sakenova, 2025). These projects aim to link Central Asia to South Asia via Afghanistan, unlocking mutual economic potential (Zaland, 2025; Zimmerman, 2015). Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have also expanded diplomatic and economic outreach towards Afghanistan, despite the lack of formal recognition of the Taliban government. In 2024, both countries removed Taliban from the list of banned terrorist organizations (Farivar, 2024).<\/p>\n
In July 2025, Kazakhstan\u2019s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Murat Nurtleu, signed a memorandum during his visit to Afghanistan, reportedly pledging $500 million in investment toward the development of a strategic railway project in western Afghanistan. The proposed railway, running from Turgundi near the Turkmen-Afghan border to the provincial capital of Herat, approximately 100 kilometers inland, is poised to enhance regional connectivity by facilitating the movement of goods from Central Asia to South Asian markets. This infrastructure investment aligns with Kazakhstan\u2019s broader strategy to diversify transit corridors and reduce its dependency on northern routes traversing Russian territory. In parallel with transit cooperation, Kazakhstan has expressed a strong commitment to deepening bilateral trade with Afghanistan. As Minister Nurtleu emphasized during the visit, Afghanistan is emerging as an \u201cimportant partner,\u201d and both governments have set a target to elevate trade turnover to $3 billion. In 2024, the bilateral trade stood at $545 million, with 97% accounted as Kazakh exports (Otkj\u00e6r, 2025). Afghanistan is now viewed as a corridor rather than a threat, reflecting Starr\u2019s idea of economic inclusion over isolation (Starr, 2007). This reframing also resonates with local narratives of shared history and trade along the ancient Silk Road (Laruelle, 2017).<\/p>\n
Mongolia\u2019s increasing interaction with Central Asia, even in the framework of broader regional integration institutions, such as SCO, marks a broader shift in regional vision. In June 2025, Mongolia concluded an interim trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union, which opens a prospect for deepening ties with Central Asian members of the EAEU, such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (Enkh-Od, 2025).<\/p>\n
Recent developments in Kazakhstan\u2013Mongolian and Uzbekistan\u2013Mongolian relations have marked a strategic shift toward deeper economic and transit cooperation, underpinned by a series of state visits and institutional agreements in 2024\u20132025. In late October 2024, Kazakhstan\u2019s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev undertook a state visit to Mongolia, during which he and President Ukhnaagiin Kh\u00fcrels\u00fckh elevated bilateral relations to the level of Strategic Partnership, a first for Mongolia in the Central Asian region. They signed 11 documents across transport, logistics, agriculture, education, and tourism sectors, including a roadmap for economic cooperation spanning 2025\u20132027 and an intergovernmental agreement on air and road transport to facilitate direct flights and cargo movement between Astana and Ulaanbaatar (President of Mongolia, 2024a; Gusseinov, 2024). In parallel, trade turnover, which stood around USD\u202f84 million in early 2024, is set to expand toward a mid hundreds million range through enhanced rail and highway connectivity, as well as by integrating Mongolia into broader corridors like the Trans Caspian International Transport Route (Sakenova, 2024; Gusseinov, 2024).<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, the Mongolian President\u2019s state visit to Uzbekistan from 23\u201326 June 2024 represented the first highest level visit between the two nations and served as a platform to launch the Mongolia\u2013Uzbekistan Intergovernmental Cooperation Commission and a Joint Committee on Road Transport, whose inaugural meetings were held in early 2025 (President of Mongolia, 2024b). Together, the leaders agreed on a comprehensive trade and investment roadmap for 2024\u20132026, committing to ten-fold expansion of trade in goods such as wool, cashmere, leather, fruit, and vegetables. Connectivity initiatives include the opening of a Tashkent\u2013Bishkek\u2013Urumqi\u2013Ulaanbaatar road corridor, a pilot road convoy, and planned direct flights between Tashkent and Ulaanbaatar scheduled for late 2025 under a newly signed air transport agreement (President of Mongolia, 2024b; Montsame, 2025). These diplomatic mobilizations underscore a concerted effort by all parties to create direct transport links to diversify traditional northern routes, thereby enhancing access to East Asian and Russian markets while embedding Mongolia more deeply into Central Asian economic spaces. Despite its role in the trilateral Russia-Mongolia-China Economic Corridor, Mongolia remains dependent on limited transit routes. The cross-border railway from Ulan-Ude through Ulaanbaatar to Tianjin provides access to Chinese seaports, but it also reinforces Mongolia\u2019s structural dependence on its two neighbors (Batsaikhan & Dabrowski, 2017). Expanding westward into Central Asia could reduce this dependency. Access to Uzbek routes connecting to the proposed Trans-Afghan Corridor could give Mongolia an indirect link to South Asian ports. Similar advantages would be afforded by potential integration with Iranian corridors, offering routes to the Persian Gulf, and with Caspian Sea links, ultimately reaching Europe via the South Caucasus and T\u00fcrkiye (Irgengioro, 2023).<\/p>\n
The construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway stands as a critical node in this emerging lattice of connectivity. It is expected to reduce transit time and costs significantly, enhancing the competitiveness of overland routes for Mongolia and Central Asia alike (Khitakhunov, 2024).<\/p>\n
Central Asia\u2019s attempts to deepen economic ties with Afghanistan face significant constraints, foremost among them being a proliferation of overlapping transit corridor initiatives that generate competition rather than cooperation. Uzbekistan has championed the Termez\u2013Mazar i Sharif\u2013Kabul\u2013Peshawar rail link, while Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have backed rival north\u2013south axes such as the Turkmenistan\u2013Afghanistan\u2013Pakistan (TAP) corridor and the Iranian backed Khaf\u2013Herat\u2013Kandahar railway. As Umarova (2025a) demonstrates, these competing projects risk fragmenting the region\u2019s strategic objectives, increasing redundancy in infrastructure investments and undercutting the collective bargaining power of Central Asian states. Simultaneously, challenges such as security instability in Afghanistan, underfunded institutional frameworks, and non aligned national transit strategies dilute the potential synergy behind regional transit schemes (Umarova, 2025b). Moreover, administrative inefficiencies, tariff discrepancies, and infrastructural disparities among Central Asian states hinder effective coordination, making joint corridor implementation difficult and undermining the realization of a cohesive transit network (IAIS, 2025).<\/p>\n
By contrast, the development of economic relations with Mongolia remains markedly less dynamic. Despite symbolic diplomacy and a few memoranda, Central Asian engagement with Mongolia largely lacks momentum in transport and trade infrastructure implementation. Limited progress in integrating Mongolia into corridors like the China\u2013Mongolia\u2013Russia Economic Corridor reflects both logistical difficulties\u2014given Mongolia\u2019s remoteness\u2014and the absence of a unified multilateral strategy among Central Asian capitals (Irgengioro, 2023). Meanwhile, external powers\u2014especially China, through its Belt and Road investments in projects like the Khorgos dry port and the China\u2013Kyrgyzstan\u2013Uzbekistan (CKU) railway, and Russia, via its dominance in Northern Corridor infrastructure and EAEU-led trade structures\u2014continue to drive the regional agenda (Lo, 2024). These external infrastructures complement regional agency but constrain the internal reconfiguration envisioned under the Greater Central Asia paradigm. Therefore, further research on the topic of viability of transformation of Greater Central Asia into a geopolitical region should focus on disaggregation of foreign powers\u2019 influence on regional agenda from the intra-regional initiatives, even though both could be intertwined.<\/p>\n
The recent revival of regionalism in Central Asia, exemplified by the Khujand Treaty and the deepening engagement with Afghanistan and Mongolia, reflects a pragmatic recalibration of intra-regional relations grounded in mutual economic interests and geopolitical necessity. As this article has demonstrated through the lens of Frederick Starr\u2019s \u201cGreater Central Asia\u201d framework, the region\u2019s leadership is increasingly prioritizing connectivity, infrastructure development, and trade facilitation as instruments of strategic interdependence. The willingness of countries to resolve entrenched border disputes, alongside growing logistical cooperation with Afghanistan and Mongolia, signals a shift away from the post-Soviet legacy of fragmentation toward a more cohesive and forward-looking regional identity.<\/p>\n
However, this emerging regionalism could be shaped, and at times constrained, by the presence and policies of external actors. While external engagement\u2014whether through China\u2019s Belt and Road Initiative, Russia\u2019s regional ambitions, or Western development initiatives\u2014has facilitated infrastructural integration, it also introduces competing priorities. As such, the future of Greater Central Asia will depend not only on the continued pursuit of pragmatic cooperation among its members but also on their ability to balance internal agency with the geopolitical realities imposed by powerful neighbors and global institutions.<\/p>\n
Ultimately, the developments explored in this article suggest that while Greater Central Asia is still in a formative phase, its recent trajectory offers cautious optimism for the consolidation of a more stable, interconnected, and self-determined regional framework. Further research is needed to evaluate the sustainability of these trends, particularly in light of Afghanistan\u2019s internal volatility and the long-term strategic intentions of external powers.<\/p>\n
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Zimmerman, T. (2015). The new silk roads: China, the US, and the future of Central Asia (pp. 1\u201326). Center on International Cooperation.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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